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Abstract. Event logs recorded during the execution of business pro-
cesses constitute a valuable source of information. Applying process min-
ing techniques to them, event logs may reveal the actual process execu-
tion and enable reasoning on quantitative or qualitative process proper-
ties. However, event logs often contain sensitive information that could
be related to individual process stakeholders through background infor-
mation and cross-correlation. We therefore argue that, when publishing
event logs, the risk of such re-identification attacks must be considered.
In this paper, we show how to quantify the re-identification risk with
measures for the individual uniqueness in event logs. We also report on a
large-scale study that explored the individual uniqueness in a collection
of publicly available event logs. Our results suggest that potentially up
to all of the cases in an event log may be re-identified, which highlights
the importance of privacy-preserving techniques in process mining.
1 Introduction
Process mining uses data recorded in the form of event logs by information sys-
tems to, for example, reveal the actual execution of business processes [1]. Since
most activities in modern organization are supported by technology, each pro-
cess execution produces a digital footprint indicating the occurrence and timing
of activities. Consequentially, event logs may contain sensitive information and
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Unfortunately, there is no general method
on how to safely remove personal and sensitive references. Since the existence of
privacy threats are generally known, the willingness to publish event logs is low.
Publicly available event logs, however, are necessary to evaluate process mining
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models [2–4] and therefore discussions are needed on how to safely publish event
logs. Against this background, we argue that it is crucial to understand the risk
of data re-identification in event logs and process mining. With this insight, we
can balance how much information of an event log can be shared and how much
should be anonymized to preserve privacy. While many examples confirm the
general risk of data re-identification [5–7], the re-identification risk of event logs
has not received much attention yet.
The intention of this paper is to raise awareness to the re-identification risk
of event logs and therefore provide measures to quantify this risk. To this end,
we provide an approach to express the uniqueness of data, which is derived from
models that are commonly adopted by process mining techniques. Each event
recorded in an event log consists of specific data types, such as the activity
name of the respective process step, the timestamp of its execution, and event
attributes that capture the context and the parameters of the activity. Addition-
ally, sequences of events that relate to the same case of a process, also known as
traces, come with data attributes, so-called case attributes that contain general
information about the case. To extract sensitive information, an adversary uses
background knowledge to link a target’s attributes with the case/event attributes
in the event log, e.g., by cross-correlating publicly-available sources. The higher
the uniqueness of an event log, the higher an adversary’s chances to identify the
target. Our approach therefore explores the number of cases that are uniquely
identifiable by the set of case attributes or the set of event attributes. We use
this information to derive a measure of uniqueness for an event log, which serves
as a basis for estimating how likely a case can be re-identified.
To demonstrate the importance of uniqueness considerations for event logs,
we conducted a large-scale study with 12 publicly available event logs from
the 4TU.Centre for Research Data repository.1 We categorized the records and
assessed the uniqueness where cases refer to a natural person. Our results for
these logs suggest that an adversary can potentially re-identify up to all of the
cases, depending on prior knowledge. We show that an adversary needs only a
few attributes of a trace to successfully mount such an attack.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
– We present an approach to quantify the privacy risk associated to event
logs. In this way, we support the identification of information that should be
suppressed when publishing an event log, thereby fostering the responsible
use of logs and paving the way for novel use cases based on event log analysis.
– By reporting the results of a large-scale evaluation study, we highlight the
need to develop privacy-preserving techniques for event logs with high utility
for process analytics. Our notions of individual uniqueness may serve as a
catalyst for such efforts, since they make the inherent privacy risks explicit.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates privacy threats in process
mining. Section 3 presents our approach for quantifying the re-identification risk.
We analyze publicly available event logs and discuss the results in Section 4. We
review related work in Section 5, before Section 6 concludes this paper.
1 https://data.4tu.nl/repository/collection:event_logs_real
Table 1: Event log example
case id activity timestamp case attributes event attributes
1000 registration 03/03/19 23:40:32 {age: 26, sex: m} {arrival: check-in}
1000 triage 03/04/19 00:27:12 {age: 26, sex: m} {status: uncritical}
1000 liquid 03/04/19 00:47:44 {age: 26, sex: m} {liquid: NaCl}
... ... ... ... ...
1001 registration 03/04/19 00:01:24 {age: 78, sex: f} {arrival: ambulance}
1001 antibiotics 03/04/19 00:09:06 {age: 78, sex: f} {drug: penicillin}
... ... ... ... ...
2 Privacy Threats in Process Mining
Process mining uses event logs to discover and analyze business processes. Event
logs capture the execution of activities as events. A finite sequence of such events
forms a trace, representing a single process instance (aka case). For example,
the treatment of patients in an emergency room includes a number of events,
such as blood sampling and analysis, which together follow a certain structure
as determined by the process. Accordingly, the events related to an individual
patient form a case. In addition, case attributes provide general information
about a case, e.g., place of birth of a patient. Each event consists of various data
types, such as the name of the respective activity, the timestamp of the execution,
and event attributes. Event attributes are event-specific and may be changing
over time, e.g., a temperature or the department performing a treatment. The
key difference between case attributes and event attributes is that case attributes
do not change their value for a case during the observed period of time. We show
a synthetic event log example capturing an emergency room process in Table 1.
Considering the structure of an event log, several privacy threats are identi-
fied. Linking a case to an individual can reveal sensitive information, e.g., in an
emergency room process, certain events can indicate that a patient is in a cer-
tain condition. In general, case attributes can contain various kinds of sensitive
data, revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophi-
cal beliefs, as well as financial or health information. Likewise, an event log can
reveal information about the productivity [8] or the work schedule of hospital
staff. Such kind of staff surveillance is a critical privacy threat. Clearly, it is es-
sential to include privacy considerations in process mining projects. We assume
that an adversary’s goal is to identify an individual in an event log linking ex-
ternal information. Depending on the type of background information, different
adversary models are possible. We assume a targeted re-identification, i.e., an
adversary has information about specific individuals, which includes a subset
of the attribute values. Based thereon, the adversary aims to reveal sensitive
information, e.g., a diagnosis. Here, we assume that an adversary knows that an
individual is present in the event log. In this paper, we consider the uniqueness
measure to quantify the re-identification risk of sensitive information, thereby
providing a basis for managing privacy considerations.
Table 2: Preparation of event log
case id sex age activity timestamp arrival channel
10 male 26 [reg., liquid, . . . ] [3/3/19, 3/4/19, . . . ] [check-in, none, . . . ]
11 female 78 [reg., antibiotics] [3/4/19, 3/4/19] [ambulance, none]
12 female 26 [reg., liquid, . . . ] [3/5/19, 3/7/19, . . . ] [check-in, none, . . . ]
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
3 Re-identifications of Event Logs
To apply our uniqueness measure to cases, we summarize all occurring event
data to its corresponding case. This assumption eases handling multiple events
belonging to the same case. Since case attributes are invariant over time, they
only need to be taken into consideration once, whereas event attributes may
be different for every event and therefore their temporal change needs to be
considered. Table 2 provides a respective example. Each row in this table belongs
to one case. The case attributes “sex” and “age” are listed in separate columns.
The columns “activity”, “timestamp”, and “arrival channel” contain an ordered
list of the respective attributes. For example, the case id 11 has only two events
and therefore two activities. The second activity “antibiotics” on March 04, 2019
has no “arrival channel” (i.e., it is “none”).
The uniqueness of an event log serves as a basis for estimating how likely a
case can be re-identified. We investigate a number of so-called projections that
can be considered as a data minimization technique, effectively reducing the
potential risks of re-identification in an event log. Projections refer to a subset
of attributes in the event log. They can easily be adopted to assess the risk
in different scenarios. Table 3 summarizes the projections for event logs and
their potential usage in process mining. Projection A contains the sequence of
all executed activities with their timestamps, while projection F only contains
the case attributes. It has been shown that even sparse projections of event
logs hold privacy risks [4]. Therefore, in our evaluation, we will consider the
re-identification risk for various projections.
3.1 Uniqueness based on case attributes
In addition to unique identifiers (UID), so-called quasi-identifiers are information
that can be linked to individuals as well. A combination of quasi-identifiers may
be sufficient to create a UID. In event logs, the case attributes can be seen as
quasi-identifier. For example, in the event log of the BPI Challenge 2018 [9], the
area of all parcels and the ID of the local department can be considered as case
attributes. Measuring the uniqueness based on case attributes is a common way
to quantify the re-identification risk [10]. Case uniqueness and thus an individual
uniqueness highly increases the risk of re-identification. A single value of a case
attribute does not lead to identification. The combination with other attributes,
Table 3: Projections of event logs
projection data included exemplary usage in process mining
A activities, timestamps analysis of bottlenecks
B activities, event and case attributes predictive process monitoring
C activities, event attributes decision mining
D activities, case attributes trace clustering
E activities process discovery
F case attributes traditional data mining
however, may lead to a unique case. In particular, when linking attributes to
other sources of information, it may result in successful re-identification.
We define uniqueness as the fraction of unique cases in a event log. Let fk
be the frequency of the kth combination of case attributes values in a sample.
One case is unique if fk = 1, i.e., there is no other case with the same values of
case attributes. Accordingly, uniqueness for case attributes is defined as
Ucase =
∑
I(fk = 1)
N
, (1)
where the indicator function I(fk = 1) is 1, if the kth combination is unique, and
N is the total number of cases in the event log. Referring to our data in Table 2,
the attribute value “sex: female” leads to two possible case candidates (id:10 and
id:11), i.e., fk = 2, which implies that the combination is not unique. Taking
“age” as an additional quasi-identifier into account, makes all three listed cases
unique, i.e., Ucase = 1. Since often a sample of the event log is published, we
distinguish between sample uniqueness and population uniqueness. The number
of unique cases in the sample is called sample uniqueness. With population
uniqueness, we refer to the amount of unique cases in the complete event log
(i.e., population). Based on the disclosed event log we can measure the sample
uniqueness. The population uniqueness is the number of cases that are unique
within the sample and are also unique in the underlying population from which
the data has been sampled. Usually the event log is a sample from a population
and the original event log is not available. Therefore, the population uniqueness
cannot be measured and must be estimated.
There are several models to estimate the population uniqueness from a sam-
ple. These methods model the population uniqueness based on extrapolations
of the contingency table to fit specific distributions to frequency counts [10].
We adopt the method of Rocher and Hendrickx [7] to estimate the population
uniqueness.2 The authors use Gaussian copulas to model population uniqueness,
approximate the marginals from the sample, and estimate the likelihood for a
sample unique being a population unique. For this analysis, we assume that
the event log is a published sample. By applying the method, we estimate the
population uniqueness of cases in terms of their case attributes.
2 Code available at https://github.com/computationalprivacy.
3.2 Uniqueness based on traces
Most of the published event logs for process mining do not have many case at-
tributes, only event attributes. For example, the Sepsis event log [11] has only one
case attribute (“age”). However, a case can also be unique based on the events.
We measure the uniqueness using the traces. A trace consists of an ordered set
of activities a1, a2, . . . an, their timestamps t1, t2, . . . tn and l event attributes
e11, . . . eln. A tuple pj = (aj , tj , e1j ,. . . ,elj) represents a point from the trace
[(a1, t1, e11, ..., el1),(a2, t2, e12, ..., el2),. . . ,(an, tn, e1n, ..., eln)]. We assume that an
adversary’s main goal is to re-identify an individual given a number of points
and to reveal other sensitive points. We argue that an adversary has a certain
knowledge and knows some points, which she is able to link with the event log.
In particular, we assume that an adversary knows that a certain person is con-
tained in the event log. In other words, we consider the published event log as
population. As our example in Table 2 shows, even without considering the case
attributes, all cases are unique: Case 11 is uniquely identifiable by its second
activity “antibiotics”. The Cases 10 and 12 are uniquely identified by combin-
ing the activity with the respective timestamp. An adversary for example might
have information about a patient’s arrival (e.g., “check-in: 3/5/19”). Given this
information as a point from the trace it is sufficient for an adversary to identify
the patient and reveal additional information from the event log.
Accordingly, we express the re-identification risk as the ratio of unique cases.
The uniqueness of a trace can be measured similarly to location trajectories [12,
13]. In location trajectories, points consist only of a location and a timestamp. In
contrast, we have not only two-dimensional but multi-dimensional points with
i.a. an activity, a resource, and a timestamp. Let {ci}i=1,...,N be the event con-
sisting of a set of N traces. Given a set of m random points, called Mp we
compute the number of traces that include the set of points. A trace is unique if
the set of points Mp is only contained in a single trace. The uniqueness of traces
given Mp is defined as
Utrace =
∑
δi
N
, (2)
where δi = 1, if a trace is unique |{ci|Mp ⊆ ci}| = 1, otherwise δi = 0.
4 Results
For our evaluation we used the publicly available event logs from the 4TU.Centre
for Research Data. We classified the event logs into real-life-individuals (R) and
software (S) event logs. The case identifier of real-life-individuals refers to a
natural person, e.g., the ADL event log [14] includes activities of daily living
activities of individuals. In event logs referring to software activities, events do
not directly refer to a natural person, but to technical components. For instance,
the BPI Challenge 2013 event log [15] consists of events from an incident man-
agement system. Some of the software related event logs even consist of a single
case, which makes measuring uniqueness of cases more difficult. However, if a
Table 4: Classification of event logs
uniqueness
event log category #cases #activities case attr. traces
ADL [14] R 75 34 no yes
BPIC 2012 [16] R 13,087 24 yes yes
BPIC 2015 [17] R 1,199 398 yes yes
BPIC 2017 [18] R 31,509 26 yes yes
BPIC 2018 [9] R 43,809 14 yes yes
CCC 2019 [19] R 10,035 8 no yes
Credit [20] R 20 29 no yes
HB [21] R 100,000 18 no yes
RlH [22] R 1,143 624 no yes
WABO [23] R 1,434 27 yes yes
RTFM [24] R 150,370 11 no yes
Sepsis [11] R 1,049 16 no yes
Apache [25] S 3 74 - -
BPIC 2013 [15] S 1,487 4 - -
BPIC 2014 [26] S 46,616 39 - -
BPIC 2016 [27] S 25,647 600 - -
BPIC 2019 [28] S 251,734 42 - -
JUnit [29] S 1 182 - -
NASA [30] S 2,566 47 - -
SWA [31] S 1 106 - -
suitable identifier can be linked to the cases, it will also be possible to measure
the uniqueness for software related event logs. For example, the incidents in the
BPI Challenge 2013 event log are processed by a natural person. By using an
appropriate transformation, this natural person could serve as a case identifier.
In the following, we apply our methods to estimate the uniqueness of the real-
life-individuals event logs (R) only. We measure the uniqueness of case attributes
for event logs with more than one case attribute only. Table 4 summarizes the
results of our classification, provides some basic metrics on the number of cases
and activities, and indicates the applied uniqueness measures.
For improved readability and for ethical considerations (see Section 4.3 for
details), we will apply our methods and discuss intermediate results in detail
only for the BPI Challenge 2018 [9] and the Sepsis [11] event logs. For all other
event logs, we provide condensed and pseudonymized results. Note that the
pseudonymized event logs in the following sections have not the same order as
in Table 4, but the pseudonymization is consistent across the evaluation.
4.1 Uniqueness results based on case attributes
The BPI Challenge 2018 event log is provided by the German company “data ex-
perts”. It contains events related to application of payments process of EU’s Agri-
Table 5: Sample uniqueness and population uniqueness (estimated) based on
case attributes (left for BPI Challenge 2018; right for all event logs)
combination sample population
PYMT 0.409 0.161
PYMT, ARA 0.476 0.164
PYMT, DPT 0.528 0.419
PYMT, #PCL 0.698 0.594
PYMT, ARA, #PCL 0.747 0.649
PYMT, DPT, #PCL 0.788 0.718
PYMT, DPT, #PCL, ARA, SF 0.845 0.971
event log sample population
3. 0.011 0.005
6. 0.035 0.071
7. 0.152 0.146
8. 1.000 0.952
cultural Guarantee Fund. The event log consists of 43,809 cases, each represent-
ing a farmer’s direct payments application over a period of three years. We iden-
tified “payment actual” (PYMT), “area” (ARA), “department” (DPT), “num-
ber parcels” (#PCL), “smallfarmer” (SF), “youngfarmer” (YF), “year” (Y) and
“amount applied” (AMT) as case attributes. The data contributor generalized
the attributes PYMT, #PCL, and AMT by grouping the values in 100 bins,
where the bins are identified by the minimum value [9].
To determine the impact of case attributes, we evaluate their uniqueness
using various combinations. Specifically, we investigate which combinations of
attribute values make cases more distinct and thus unique. The more extensive
an adversary’s background knowledge is, the more likely it is that this individual
becomes unique and thus identifiable. For each combination, we count the num-
ber of unique cases. As expected, the more case attributes are known, the more
unique the cases become. Table 5 (left) shows that when considering PYMT only,
there are 40.9% unique cases. In combination with #PCL, uniqueness increases
to 69.8%. With all case attributes, 84.5% of the cases are unique in the sample.
However, the sample uniqueness alone does not lead to a high re-identification
risk. Therefore we also have to consider the population uniqueness We used the
method described in Section 3.1 to estimate the population uniqueness and ap-
proximate the marginals from the published event log. In Table 5 (left), we
present the average estimated population uniqueness of five runs. Interestingly,
the population uniqueness with a single case attribute (PYMT) is already 16.1%.
Considering all case attributes, a population uniqueness of around 97% is ob-
served. We measure the sample uniqueness and estimate the population unique-
ness for all event logs with more than one case attribute resulting in four event
logs for the analysis. We do not consider case attributes that contain activities
of the event log (i.e., the first executed activity), since we assume that an adver-
sary does not know the exact order of executed activities. Table 5 (right) lists
the average sample uniqueness and the average estimated population uniqueness
after five runs. We notice that not all event logs show a high uniqueness based
on the case attributes. In case of the BPI Challenge 2018 event log, it can be
observed that even a small number of case attributes produces a high uniqueness
and thus a high re-identification risk.
4.2 Uniqueness results based on traces
The Sepsis event log is obtained from the information system of a Dutch hospi-
tal. It contains events related to logistics and treatment of patients that enter
the emergency room and are suspected to suffer from sepsis, which is a life-
threatening condition that warrants immediate treatment. Originally, the event
log was analyzed regarding the adherence to guidelines on timely administra-
tion of antibiotics and, more generally, related to the overall trajectory of pa-
tients [32]. The data was made publicly available for research purposes [11].
Several measures were taken to prevent identification, including:
– randomization of timestamps by perturbing the start of cases and adjusting
timestamps of respective subsequent events accordingly
– pseudonymization of discharge related activities, e.g., “Release A”
– generalization of employee information by stating the department only
– pseudonymization of the working diagnosis
– generalization of age to groups of 5 years and at least 10 people.
The event log consists of 1,049 cases with 16 different activities. Each case rep-
resents the pathway through the hospital of a natural person. The traces have
an average length of 14 points (min = 3, max = 185). In contrast to the BPI
Challenge 2018 event log, the Sepsis event log has only one attribute that can
be used as a case attribute.
To estimate the uniqueness of traces, we use the method described in Sec-
tion 3.2. The points in the Sepsis event log consist of activities, timestamps, and
departments that are currently responsible for a patient’s treatment. The “age”
serves as case attribute. Since patients are treated in different departments, the
“department” does not satisfy the time-invariant criteria of a case attribute (cf.
Section 2). For each case, we randomly select m points of the trace and count the
number of traces with identical points. In other words, we look for other traces
that for example include the same activities by the same department. We opt for
a random point selection to avoid making assumptions on the adversary’s knowl-
edge. We are aware that this may underestimate the re-identification risk. As
a consequence, a high uniqueness in our results emphasizes the re-identification
risk as a more sophisticated and optimized point selection would likely lead to
an even higher uniqueness.
In Figure 1, we show the uniqueness of traces for different values of m points
and different projections.3 As expected, we generally observe that more points
lead to a higher uniqueness. Assuming that timestamps are correct (which they
are not), projection A shows that four points including the activity and the
timestamp are sufficient to identify all traces. By generalizing timestamps, i.e.,
reducing the resolution to days, only 31% of traces are unique when considering
four points and 70% when considering all points of a trace. Hence, the results
clearly show the impact of generalization on the re-identification risk.
The privacy-enhancing effect of removing values from the event log becomes
apparent, when considering the other projections. Projection B, for example,
3 Code available at https://github.com/d-o-m-i-n-i-k/re-identification-risk.
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Fig. 1: Uniqueness based on traces for Sepsis event log.
omits timestamps but otherwise assumes that an adversary has background
knowledge on all activities, case and event attributes. Yet, it is able to sig-
nificantly limit the uniqueness to approximately 37%. Projection D, where case
attributes and activities are still included, is even able to limit the uniqueness
of traces to a maximum of 9%. The uniqueness of traces remains stable for more
than 64 points since only 2% of the traces have more than 64 points.
Our method of estimating the uniqueness based on traces can be applied
to all event logs categorized as real-life-individuals (R). Figure 2 presents the
uniqueness for all event logs for different projections. We evaluate the uniqueness
given 10%, 50%, and 90% of possible points per trace, i.e., an adversary knows
this number of points per case. Grey fields without numbers imply that this
projection could not be evaluated due to missing attributes.
In Figure 2 we observe a similar trend as before for the Sepsis event log:
Projection A generally leads to a high uniqueness. By omitting information,
expressed by the various projections, the uniqueness decreases. This becomes
apparent when comparing projection B to C, where the case attributes are re-
moved. Projection E, i.e., considering the activities only, leads to a small unique-
ness, with the exception of event log 5 and 9. We explain this by the fact that
these event logs have many different activities and have a varying trace length
per case. For event log 10, we can already see a clear reduction of the uniqueness
for projection B. This can be explained by the small number of case attributes
and small number of unique activities.
The most surprising event log is 11. It has no unique cases. The prime reason
for this difference is the result of a timestamp in daily resolution and the small
number of unique activities. It is worth adding that increasing the number of
points from 10% to 50% is significant with respect to uniqueness compared to the
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Fig. 2: Uniqueness based on traces for all event logs.
number of points from 50% to 90%. For example, the uniqueness of projection A
for event log 10 increases from 62.4% in Figure 2a to 73.7% in Figure 2b. Given
90% of points of the trace, we cannot observe an increase of the uniqueness for
event log 10. This can also be observed for other event logs and other projections.
The prime cause of this is the high variance of the trace length.
Overall in our study, we find that the uniqueness based on traces is higher
than on case attributes (cf. results in Table 5). For example, event log 3 has a
sample uniqueness based on case attributes of 1.1%. Based on traces, however,
it reaches for projection C a case uniqueness of 84.4%. We conclude that traces
are particularly vulnerable to data re-identification attacks.
4.3 Discussion
Our results demonstrate that 11 of 12 evaluated event logs have a unique-
ness greater than 62%, even for a random selection of trace points. More spe-
cific information, e.g., the order of individual activities, can lead to a greater
uniqueness with fewer points. Additional knowledge about the process in gen-
eral could be used by an adversary to predict certain activities, which was
also confirmed in [33]. The random selection, however, clearly shows that lit-
tle background knowledge is sufficient and already induces a considerable re-
identification risk for event logs. In contrast, generalization of attributes helps to
reduce the risk [34]. The results, however, show that combining several attributes,
such as case attributes and activities, still yields unique cases. In combination
with lowering the resolution of values, e.g., publishing only the year of birth
instead of the full birthday, reduces the re-identification risk. Such generaliza-
tion techniques can also be applied to timestamps, activities, or case attributes.
Along the lines of the data minimization principle, i.e., limiting the amount of
personal data, omitting data is simply the most profound way to reduce the risk,
which we clearly see when taking our projections into account. Consequently, the
projections can be used to reduce the re-identification risk.
We apply our methods to already published event logs to point out the risk of
re-identification in the domain of process mining. To this end, we only quantify
the risk and refrain from cross-correlating other event logs, which might re-
identify individuals. In addition, we take measures such as pseudonymizing event
logs in our evaluation to neither expose nor blame specific event logs.
5 Related Work
Re-Identification Attacks Re-identification attacks were addressed and success-
fully carried out in the past by a large number of researchers [6,7,12,13,35,36].
Narayanan and Shmatikov [35] de-anonymize a data set from Netflix containing
movie ratings by cross-correlating multiple data sets. In [36], they modified their
approach to apply it to social networks. In contrast, our adversary’s goal is to
re-identify an individual (also known as singling out) and not reconstruct all
attribute values of an individual. We therefore measure the uniqueness. We base
our uniqueness measures on two well-known approaches [7,12,13] and adapt them
for the domain of event logs and process mining. Rocher et al. [7] estimate the
population uniqueness based on given attribute values. We employ their method
to estimate the uniqueness based on case attributes. Our method to estimate the
uniqueness based on traces relies on the approach presented in [12, 13], where
uniqueness in mobility traces with location data is estimated. Due to the struc-
ture of an event log, both methods alone are not sufficient to determine the
uniqueness in event logs and require data preparation. For example, event logs
have a specific format that requires transformation in order to apply uniqueness
measures on traces.
Privacy in process mining Awareness of privacy issues in process mining
has increased [37], particularly since the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) was put into effect. Although the Process Mining Manifesto [38] de-
mands to balance utility and privacy in process mining applications, the number
of related contributions is still rather small. To preserve privacy in event logs
while still discovering the correct main process behavior has been addressed
by Fahrenkrog-Petersen et al. [4]. Their algorithm guarantees k-anonymity and
t-closeness while maximizing the utility of the sanitized event log. In general,
k-anonymity aggregates the data in such a way that each individual cannot be
distinguished based on its values from at least k−1 other individuals of the data
set [39, 40]. Yet, it has been shown in the past that neither k-anonymity, nor
t-closeness are sufficient to provide strong privacy guarantees [41].
The strongest privacy model available to date, which provides provable pri-
vacy guarantees, is differential privacy. It was recently incorporated in a first
privacy-preserving technique for process mining [2]. The approach presents a pri-
vacy engine capable of keeping personal data private by adding noise to queries.
The privacy techniques of [2, 4] have been combined in a web-based tool [3].
Pseudonymization of data sets related to process mining has been discussed
in [42,43]. Values of the original data set is replaced with pseudonyms. However,
the encryption still allows for a potential re-identification by an adversary with
knowledge about the domain and the statistical distribution of the encrypted
data. Beside technological privacy challenges for process mining, the approach
of [44] also discuss organizational privacy challenges by means of a framework.
Although, the approach points to several privacy concerns in process mining, no
technical solution is presented. Pika et al. [33] assess the suitability of existing
privacy-preserving approaches for process mining data. They propose a frame-
work to support privacy-preserving process mining analysis. While Pika et al.
analyze the suitability of existing data transformation approaches to anonymize
process data, they do not provide an approach to support the identification of
information, e.g., atypical process behavior, that should be suppressed to reduce
the re-identification risk of subjects. Our metric fills this gap and helps data
owners to identify the unique cases with atypical process behavior.
In comparison to existing related works on privacy-aware approaches for
process mining, this paper makes an attempt to quantify the re-identification
risk. Data publishers can determine which information should be suppressed
before releasing an event log for process mining. If a high re-identification risk
is detected, the approaches mentioned above might be able to lower the risk of
re-identification and therefore to provide higher privacy guarantees.
6 Conclusion
This paper identifies and evaluates the risk of re-identification in event logs for
process mining. We reveal that there is a serious privacy leakage in the vast
majority of the event logs used widely in the community. To address this issue,
we argue for the use of methods to estimate the uniqueness that allow event
log publishers to carefully evaluate their event logs before release and if need to
suppress certain information. Overall, real-world data traces are an essential
means to evaluate and compare algorithms. This paper shows that we as a
community have to act more carefully, though, when releasing event logs, while
also highlighting the need to develop privacy-preserving techniques for event
logs. We believe that this work will foster the trust and increases the willingness
for sharing event logs while providing privacy guarantees.
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